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Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 51 (2019)

Klatsky Endowed Lecture in
Human Rights
*

Catherine Marchi-Uhel ◊
Dear Dean Scharf, Ladies and Gentlemen, Dear Colleagues,
I am very honoured to accept the Frederick Cox Award for
Advancing Global Justice, and to be here with you today to deliver
the Klatsky Endowed Human Rights Lecture.
Today, no situation can highlight the need and urgency to
advance global justice more than the situation in Syria. Since the
beginning of the crisis, countless reports of atrocities committed on all
sides have been brought to the attention of the international
community, involving widespread violations of human rights and

*

This article is adapted from the author’s speech at the Klatsky Endowed
Lecture in Human Rights, presented by the Head of the United Nations
International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism to Assist in the
Investigation and Prosecution of Persons Responsible for the Most
Serious Crimes under International Law Committed in the Syrian Arab
Republic since March 2011.

◊.

Catherine Marchi-Uhel, was appointed to head of the United Nations
International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism for Syria (IIIM) on
3 July 2017. Marchi-Uhel is a former French judge with broad
international experience trying and adjudicating war crimes. During her
27-year career, Marchi-Uhel has provided legal support to the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, the UN
Mission in Liberia, and the UN Interim Administration Mission in
Kosovo. She has also adjudicated for the Extraordinary Chambers in the
Courts of Cambodia and served as Ombudsperson to the UN Security
Council’s Sanctions Committee. Before, that, she has served as Head of
Chambers at the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia (ICTY). Ms. Marchi-Uhel previously served as a full-time
international judge at the Pre-Trial Chamber of the Extraordinary
Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) and was a Senior Legal
Officer with the ICTY Appeals Chamber. From July 2014 to April 2015,
Ms. Marchi-Uhel was seconded to the United Nations Mission in Liberia
(UNMIL) as Principal Rule of Law Officer, advising the Special
Representative of the Secretary-General and the Deputy Special
Representative of the Secretary-General for Rule of Law on justice and
security matters. Ms. Marchi-Uhel became a member of the French
judiciary in 1989 and served as juge du siège at the Tribunal de Grande
Instance de Coutances, being specially in charge of cases involving
juveniles. She was later seconded to the French Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, Legal Affairs Division, Human Rights Section before joining the
United Nations. Ms. Marchi-Uhel studied law at the Université Paris I
— Panthéon Sorbonne and at the Université de Caen Basse-Normandie.
She was an auditeur de justice at the Ecole Nationale de la
Magistrature.

223

Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 51 (2019)
Klatsky Endowed Lecture in Human Rights

international humanitarian law. 1 Depending on the circumstances,
these allegations may amount to core international crimes. They
involve torture; enforced disappearance; extrajudicial killings; sexual
violence against females and males, including sexual slavery; and
attacks against civilians and civilian objects, including schools,
medical facilities and personnel; and the use of chemical weapons. 2
The horrors suffered by the Syrian people over the past seven
years defy description, and so far, the affected communities have
been, understandably, disillusioned by the prospects of seeing justice. 3
Since the outbreak of violence in 2011, the Security Council has
failed to refer the situation in Syria to the International Criminal
Court or to create an ad hoc tribunal. 4 It is against this background
that, in December 2016, the General Assembly established the
International, Impartial, and Independent Mechanism to Assist in the
Investigation and Prosecution of Persons Responsible for the Most
Serious Crimes under International Law Committed in the Syrian
Arab Republic since March 2011. 5 I will refer to it as “the
Mechanism.”
The long title already reveals key aspects of the Mechanism’s
mandate. This body is innovative in many ways and differs
significantly from previous accountability initiatives established by
the United Nations, such as, for instance, the ad hoc tribunals for the
Former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda, although it significantly builds
on their experiences. 6
As you know, the Mechanism is not a prosecutor’s office nor a
court. It cannot issue indictments, prosecute cases, or render
1.

See generally U.N. Hum. Rts. Council, Report of the independent
international commission of inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, U.N.
Doc. A/HRC/27/60 (Aug. 13, 2014) (compiling numerous reports on the
human rights violations committed by the Syrian government).

2.

Id.

3.

Anne Barnard, Ben Hubbard, & Ian Fisher, As Atrocities Mount in
Syria, Justice Seems Out of Reach, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 15, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/15/world/middleeast/syria-basharal-assad-evidence.html [https://perma.cc/W63C-JTXE].

4.

Mark Kerston, Calls for Prosecuting War Crimes in Syria are Growing.
Is International Justice Possible?, WASH. POST (Oct. 14, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/
10/14/calls-for-prosecuting-war-crimes-in-syria-are-growing-isinternational-justice-possible/ [https://perma.cc/4KFY-DGGW].

5.

G.A. Res. 71/248 (Dec. 19, 2016) [hereinafter The Mechanism].

6.

See generally Paul R. Williams, Lisa K. Dicker & C. Danae Patterson,
The Peace vs. Justice Puzzle and the Syrian Crisis, 24 ILSA J. INT’L &
COMP. L. 2 (2018) (outlining how war crimes have been handled in the
past through the use of tribunals, investigations, and other
mechanisms).
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judgments. 7 Instead, it is mandated to collect, consolidate, preserve
and analyse evidence of violations collected by a variety of actors over
the past 7 years, including UN bodies, Syrian and international
NGOs, individuals, and States. 8
It is further mandated to prepare files to facilitate and expedite
fair and independent criminal proceedings, in accordance with
international law standards, in national, regional or international
courts or tribunals that have, or may in the future have, jurisdiction
over these crimes. 9
Currently, this includes national courts that can exercise
jurisdiction, such as forms of universal jurisdiction, over certain
crimes committed in Syria. 10 However, in the future, these crimes
could also be prosecuted at the international level, either by the ICC,
or by a new ad hoc tribunal for Syria, or even by a regional court. 11 It
is also hoped that, in the future, Syrian courts themselves will be able
to take their part in this process.
In other words, the Mechanism has been mandated to conduct the
essential preparatory work grounded in criminal law methodologies
that will be needed for accountability processes, regardless of which
judicial avenues may emerge in the future. 12
I believe that the creation of the Mechanism is an important
demonstration of the international community’s will to ensure that
crimes committed in Syria do not go unpunished. Its innovative
mandate, that recognizes the value of creating synergies between
international human rights fact-finding and criminal justice processes,
7.

Beti Hohler & Elizabeth Pederson, The Syria Mechanism: Bridge to
Prosecutions or Evidentiary Limbo?, E-INT’L REL. (May 26, 2017),
https://www.e-ir.info/2017/05/26/the-syria-mechanism-bridge-toprosecutions-or-evidentiary-limbo/ [https://perma.cc/V5Q8-DAPS].

8.

Id.

9.

Id.

10.

Id.; see Stephanie Nebehay, War Crimes Evidence in Syria
‘Overwhelming’, Not All Can be Pursued: U.N., THOMPSON REUTERS
(Mar. 26, 2018, 1:54 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideastcrisis-syria-warcrimes/war-crimes-evidence-in-syria-overwhelming-notall-can-be-pursued-u-n-idUSKBN1H22GN
[https://perma.cc/8UCYE7RT].

11.

See Brian Stauffer, “These Are The Crimes We Are Fleeing”: Justice
for Syria in Swedish and German Courts, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Oct. 3,
2017),
https://www.hrw.org/report/2017/10/03/these-are-crimes-weare-fleeing/justice-syria-swedish-and-german-courts
[https://perma.cc/2GJZ-QKLJ] (noting that Syria is not now subject to
the ICC and the challenges associated with prosecution of Syrian war
crimes).

12.

See The Mechanism, supra note 5, at ¶¶ 1-6 (outlining the duties under
the Mechanism that support this groundwork preparation).
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constitutes a crucial step forward towards ensuring accountability for
these crimes.
In carrying out its functions, the Mechanism is guided by the
fundamental principles of independence and impartiality. 13 With
regard to independence, this means that the Mechanism does not act
on instructions from any entity in performing its work, 14 nor is it
influenced by the agendas of external actors. 15 Regarding the material
it collects from various sources, the Mechanism will not import the
conclusions drawn by other bodies. 16 Instead, in all instances, it will
make its own objective assessment of material received and draw its
own inferences, applying a criminal law standard. 17 In terms of
impartiality, the Mechanism will not apply any bias against, or in
favour of, any particular State, group or individual. 18 Instead, it will
address crimes committed in Syria regardless of any affiliation of the
alleged perpetrators. 19
In discharging its mandate, the Mechanism is confronted with
numerous challenges, one of the main ones being the unprecedented
volumes, fragmentation and duplication of potential evidence of
crimes in Syria collected by individuals, NGOs and other entities.20
This includes large amounts of images and video material. 21 It is not
by chance that the Syrian conflict has been tag-lined as the most
recorded conflict in the world. 22 This in turn presents two important
13.

Id. at 2.

14.

Id.

15.

Id.

16.

See U.N. Secretary-General, Implementation of the resolution
establishing the International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism to
Assist in the Investigation and Prosecution of Persons Responsible for
the Most Serious Crimes under International Law Committed in the
Syrian Arab Republic since March 2011 [hereinafter Implementation], U.
N. Doc. A/71/755 (Jan. 19, 2017) (outlining the steps in investigation
include gathering the intel and then directly reporting it without
intervening conclusions).

17.

Id.

18.

Id.

19.

Id.

20.

Hohler, supra note 7.

21.

Head of the Mechanism Catherine Marchi-Uhel, Informal Debate on the
International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism to Assist in the
Investigation and Prosecution of Persons Responsible for the Most
Serious Crimes under International Law Committed in the Syrian Arab
Republic since March 2011 [hereinafter Debates], at 2 (Apr. 18, 2018).

22.

See Armin Rosen, Erasing History: YouTube’s Deletion of Syria War
Videos Concerns Human Rights Groups, FAST COMPANY (Mar. 7, 2018),
https://www.fastcompany.com/40540411/erasing-history-youtubesdeletion-of-syria-war-videos-concerns-human-rights-groups
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challenges. The first one relates to the preservation and analysis of
such volumes of material. To be able to do so, the Mechanism has
acquired a state-of-the-art evidence management system, as mandated
in its terms of reference, and has implemented effective measures
aimed at protecting confidential materials and work-product against
cyber-attacks. 23 Data protection and information security are key
priorities, and the Mechanism is firm in its commitment not to
compromise the safety and security of material in its possession,
including sensitive data of victims and witnesses. 24 The second
challenge flowing from the availability of such significant volumes of
potentially relevant data relates to duplication, for instance when
multiple entities are in possession of similar or identical material that
eventually makes its way into the Mechanism’s collection.25
Evidentiary challenges can also arise from collection techniques
inconsistent with criminal law standards. 26 In this respect, the
Mechanism’s IT systems provide a framework for meticulously
organizing the material, ensuring that it is easily searchable and that
appropriate metadata are established, integrated and maintained to
facilitate analysis and corroboration of existing material. 27 Methods
for tracking duplicate material, linking translations and rigorously
enforcing confidentiality restrictions, including using cutting-edge
technology, are also being integrated. 28
Another key challenge for the Mechanism is ensuring sustained
funding. In creating the Mechanism, the General Assembly decided
that it would be funded by voluntary contributions. 29 However, as you
know, voluntary funding is not appropriate for international justice
mechanisms. This was recognised by the General Assembly when, in
December 2017, it called upon the Secretary General of the United
Nations to include the necessary funding for the Mechanism in his

[https://perma.cc/HP42-2S5G] (“You have more hours of footage of the
Syrian civil war on YouTube [than] there actually are hours of the war
in real life.”).
23.

Debates, supra note 21, at 2.

24.

Id.

25.

Hohler, supra note 7.

26.

U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the International, Impartial and
Independent Mechanism to Assist in the Investigation and Prosecution
of Persons Responsible for the Most Serious Crimes Under International
Law Committed in the Syrian Arab Republic Since March 2011,
[hereinafter Report] ¶ 20, U.N. Doc. A/72/762 (Feb. 28, 2018).

27.

Id. at ¶ 35.

28.

Id.

29.

Implementation, supra note 16, at ¶ 51.
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next budget proposal. 30 My team and I are currently preparing our
budget submission and I am optimistic that the Mechanism will shift
to regular budget funding by 2020. Securing regular budget funding
for the Mechanism would be a significant step forward and it would
demonstrate the international community’s genuine commitment to
justice for the victims of crimes in Syria.
Turning to current priorities, the Mechanism is committed to
turning its Evidence Collection into a comprehensive central
repository of evidence concerning crimes in Syria that can be used as
a resource to facilitate accountability. This is possible given the
Mechanism’s broad mandate; and its dedicated focus and capacity to
access material from a wide range of sources. In line with this
objective, the Mechanism is progressing in its efforts to collect
information and evidence from a variety of sources, including UN
entities, civil society, States and other actors. 31
With regard to UN entities, the Independent International
Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic (The
Commission) is a privileged interlocutor for the Mechanism. 32 The
Commission was established by the Human Rights Council on 22
August 2011 to investigate alleged violations of international
humanitarian and human rights law since March 2011. 33 By the time
the Mechanism was established, the Commission had already been
working on documenting crimes in Syria for over five years, producing
several public reports and presenting its findings to the Human Rights
Council. 34 The material collected by the Commission is of great
relevance to the Mechanism’s work, although significant differences
exist between the two bodies, which have distinct and complementary
mandates. 35 The Commission focuses on directly collecting

30.

G.A. Res. 72/191, ¶ 35 (Jan. 23, 2018).

31.

Debates, supra note 21, at 2.

32.

See Report, supra note 26, at ¶ 12 (defining The Commission’s role
within the Mechanism).

33.

U.N. Hum. Rts. Council [UNHRC] Resolution Adopted by the Human
Rights Council at its Seventeenth Special Session [hereinafter UNHRC]
S-17/1 (Aug. 22, 2011).

34.

See Report, supra note 26 (stating that resolution 71/248 establishing
the Mechanism was adopted on 21 December 2016); see also UNHRC,
supra note 33 (stating that the Commission established on 22 August
2011).

35.

Compare The Mechanism, supra note 5, at ¶ 1 (stating that the
Mechanism’s purpose is to assist in the investigation and prosecution of
persons responsible for the most serious crimes under international law
and to collect and analyze information and evidence of such crimes),
with UNHRC, supra note 33, at ¶ 13 (stating that the Commission’s
purpose is to investigate all violations of international human rights law
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information, publicly reporting broad patterns of human rights and
international
humanitarian
law
violations,
and
making
recommendations, in particular, to Member States. 36 In contrast, the
Mechanism focuses on the most serious crimes, and is required to
maintain the confidentiality of its substantive work. 37 Other notable
differences between the two bodies include the standard of proof. The
Commission of Inquiry adopts the “reasonable grounds to believe”
standard to attribute responsibility to a certain party, 38 while the
Mechanism focuses on individual criminal responsibility and is guided
by criminal law methodologies and standards. 39
The resolution creating the Mechanism contains an express
reference to the work of the Commission, and access to its holdings is
a central requirement in the Mechanism’s mandate. 40 Indeed, this has
been a priority from the very start of its work. In March, a
memorandum of understanding was signed between the two entities,
allowing for an important part of the Commission’s material to be
shared with the Mechanism. 41
In addition to the Commission of Inquiry on Syria, the
Mechanism is engaging with other United Nations entities and
identifying concrete opportunities for coordination and cooperation
including, where possible, access to relevant material in their
possession. 42
The Mechanism is also engaging extensively with civil society, in
particular Syrian NGOs, whose important role in documenting crimes
the Mechanism has recognised since the very start. 43 Since violent
unrest erupted in March 2011, and as the country descended into
armed conflict, numerous individuals and organisations have been
relentlessly documenting violations of human rights and international
humanitarian law, some of which may amount to international crimes,

and to collect all facts and circumstances that may amount to such
violations).
36.

UNHRC, supra note 33, at ¶ 13.

37.

See generally Report, supra note 26 (establishing the Mechanism’s focus
on the most serious crimes and intent to maintain confidentiality).

38.

UNHRC, Report of the Independent International Commission of
Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic [hereinafter UNHRC Report]
A/HRC/39/65, at ¶ 3 (Aug. 9, 2018).

39.

Implementation, supra note 16, at ¶¶ 13, 15, 19, 23.

40.

The Mechanism, supra note 5, at ¶ 1.

41.

G.A. Res. 37/L.38, ¶ 47 (Mar. 19, 2018).

42.

Implementation, supra note 16, at ¶ 12.

43.

Id. at ¶ 5.
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often at great risk to their own lives. 44 The material they have
gathered is an integral part of what the Mechanism seeks access to,
with a view to implementing its mandate. To this end, the
Mechanism has developed and distributed numerous contributor
surveys to elicit information from upstream collectors regarding the
type, quantity, format and content of relevant material held by
them. 45 The results of the surveys are being collated to give the
Mechanism an overview of the material in question and to prioritize
collection efforts.
The Mechanism is also committed to ensuring two-way
communication with civil society, in particular Syrian NGOs, and to
ensuring that the voices of victims are heard and appropriately
factored into its work. 46 To this end, it is engaging in an ongoing
dialogue both one-to-one as well as in group settings. 47 On 3 April in
Lausanne, the Mechanism and 28 Syrian NGOs signed a protocol of
collaboration outlining a set of overarching principles to guide mutual
engagement. 48 The Protocol aims to promote mutual understanding
regarding opportunities for collaboration, in furtherance of the parties’
common goal of ensuring accountability for the crimes committed in
the Syrian Arab Republic. 49 The principles outlined in the protocol
provide a general framework for cooperation that can extend to other
NGOs willing to collaborate with the Mechanism in the future.
The Mechanism is also continuing its engagement with States,
many of which are willing to provide it with relevant information and
evidence in their possession. 50 Several States have already revised, or

44.

Id. at ¶ 5; International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism,
Protocol of Cooperation Between the International, Independent and
Impartial Mechanism and Syrian Civil Society Organizations
Participating in the Lausanne Platform [hereinafter Lausanne Protocol],
at
1,
available
at
https://iiim.un.org/wpcontent/uploads/2018/04/Protocol_IIIM_-_Syrian_NGOs_English.pdf
[http://perma.cc/8YYX-ATVE].

45.

Debates, supra note 21, at 2.

46.

Lausanne Protocol, supra note 44, at 2.

47.

See generally id. at 2, 4 (allowing Syrian NGOs and organizations to
openly communicate with the Mechanism and ensure continuous
dialogue).

48.

Id. at 1.

49.

Id.

50.

Implementation, supra note 16; Press Release, European Commission,
The European Union steps up its support for investigations into war
crimes and accountability in Syria (Jul. 19, 2017), available at
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-2069_en.htm
[https://perma.cc/8JJX-ZP5X].
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are in the process of revising, their national laws and procedures to
allow full engagement with the Mechanism. 51
Moving on to another priority, the Mechanism has identified the
need for a Structural Investigation to ensure a broad, contextual
understanding of the Syrian situation. 52 The Structural Investigation
seeks to map crime patterns, examine the contextual elements
required to establish core crimes, and apprehend the cultural,
historical, and gender dimension of crimes, as well as the structures
of power and links between crimes and individuals, ranging from
direct physical perpetrators to other perpetrators wielding power and
authority over the events. 53
The Structural Investigation also provides a crucial framework for
another of the Mechanism’s key priorities, namely the building of case
files. 54 Indeed, the volume of allegations and the number of potential
perpetrators make it impossible for the Mechanism to address all
crimes committed in Syria since March 2011. 55 The Structural
Investigation provides a principled foundation for the Mechanism to
exercise discretion, in an independent and impartial manner, about
which cases to build. 56 It also promotes consistency of approach across
the Mechanism’s case files, given that the key factual questions
addressed in the context of the Structural Investigation potentially
constitute cross-cutting material facts in the case files. 57 These
51.

Debates, supra note 21, at 3.

52.

U.N. Office at Geneva, Press Conference by Catherine Marchi-Uhel,
Head of the International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism to
Assist in the Investigation and Prosecution of Persons Responsible for
the Most Serious Crimes Under International Law Committed in the
Syrian Arab Republic Since March 2011 [hereinafter Press Conference],
(Sept.
20,
2018)
available
at
https://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B9C2E/(httpNewsByYear_en)/BF
0B4A22311CE715C125830F00552D8A?OpenDocument
[https://perma.cc/A328-5CR6].

53.

Id.

54.

Id.

55.

See Nousha Kabawat & Fernando Travesi, Justice for Syrian Victims
Beyond Trials: The Need for New, Innovative Uses for Documentation
of Human Rights Violations in Syria, INT’L CEN. FOR TRANSITIONAL
JUST.
[ICTJ],
at
1
(Feb.
2018),
https://www.ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-BriefingSyria_Documentation-2018.pdf
[http://perma.cc/Q6E8-DMX8]
(explaining that the Syrian was is the most documented conflict in
history and that information and stories have piled up, remaining
unused in databases and files).

56.

Press Conference, supra note 52.

57.

U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the International, Impartial and
Independent Mechanism to Assist in the Investigation and Prosecution
of Persons Responsible for the Most Serious Crimes Under International
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include, for example, the existence and nature of armed conflicts and
of widespread or systematic attacks – for war crimes and crimes
against humanity charges, respectively; as well as command structures
and joint action resulting in the commission of crimes – for theories of
individual responsibility such as superior responsibility and coperpetration. 58
When it comes to selection of specific case files, the Mechanism is
guided by the principles outlined in its First Report to the General
Assembly. 59 Based on the results of the Structural Investigation, case
selection will reflect a range of factors, including the gravity of crimes;
the level and type of alleged perpetrator; crime categories emblematic
of the events in the Syrian Arab Republic; a fair representation of
crimes committed against victims on all sides of the events; a fair
representation of harms experienced by men, women, girls and boys;
crime categories and culpable acts or omissions that sustain the
ongoing commission of crimes; and complementarity with case files
developed by other actors, including national authorities and civil
society. 60
Finally, a key priority for the Mechanism is supporting national
jurisdictions’ efforts to investigate and prosecute crimes committed in
Syria. 61 To this end, the Mechanism is continuing its proactive
engagement with national war crimes units in various States, both
directly as well as in the context of relevant fora, such as the EU
Genocide Network hosted by Eurojust in The Hague. 62 Consultations
held so far have identified areas where the Mechanism can be of
assistance to overcome some of the major challenges that national
prosecutors face, including limited resources, lack of access to the
territory, and the constraints deriving from their own system’s
procedural rules. 63 In this sense, the Mechanism’s unique status offers
many advantages. First, the Mechanism can rely on a substantial
analytical capacity, including an important Arabic-speaking
component. Second, the mandate from the General Assembly places
the Mechanism in a privileged position to access and analyse material
held by others, which allows it to benefit from the collection and
centralisation of considerable amounts of potential evidence.

Law Committed in the Syrian Arab Republic Since March 2011,
[hereinafter Report II] ¶ 16, U.N. Doc. A/73/295 (Aug. 3, 2018).
58.

Id.

59.

Id. at ¶ 19.

60.

Id.

61.

Id. at ¶ 20.

62.

Id. at ¶ 36.

63.

Id.
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Furthermore, the Mechanism can rely on a flexible procedure, not
bound by specific rules as is the case for national jurisdictions.
To date, the Mechanism has received and is currently processing
several requests for information and evidence addressed to it by
national war crimes units. 64 These requests for assistance are also
informing the Mechanism collection effort and where possible, priority
is being given to the collection of material most likely to assist
ongoing national criminal justice processes.
While its mandate is firmly centered on supporting criminal
prosecutions, the Mechanism also recognizes that criminal
accountability is a component of a broader transitional justice
process. The information collected by the Mechanism, for example,
may be of relevance not only in the context of criminal proceedings,
but also in the context of other transitional justice objectives. 65 These
include, for instance, the search for missing persons as well as vetting
and reparations processes. Although the Mechanism’s mandate does
not explicitly contemplate contribution to other forms of transitional
justice, the experience of international tribunals set up by the
Security Council, for instance, has revealed how overtime, legacy
going beyond classic forms of justice has become an important part of
their contribution. 66 With those objectives in mind, the Mechanism
understands its scope for maximizing the utility of its evidence
collection for broader transitional justice purposes and is open to
possible developments in this regard.
I would like to spend a few words on the meaning of justice and
on the significance of the Mechanism’s work for those most affected
by the crimes in Syria. I believe that justice has no meaning unless
accountability efforts are not driven by the demands of victims. This
is why, in performing this crucial preparatory work, the Mechanism is
guided by a victim-centred approach, aimed at strengthening the
confidence of the affected Syrian communities in the prospect of
justice and promoting the dignity of the victims. 67 The Mechanism is
further committed to promoting outreach and effective exchanges
with affected communities, as well as hearing the views and interests
of victims and making sure that these are canvassed and considered
on an ongoing basis. 68
The Mechanism is mindful of the risk of marginalizing the
experiences of certain categories of victims in international justice
processes—I am thinking in particular of victims of sexual and
64.

Id. at ¶ 21.

65.

Id. at ¶ 48.

66.

Id.

67.

Report, supra note 26, at ¶ 4.

68.

Id. at ¶ 22.
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gender-based violence. It is not by chance that special emphasis is
placed on these crimes in the Mechanism’s terms of reference.69
Important lessons in this regard have been learned from the
experience of the international tribunals over the past 25 years, and I
see a real opportunity for the Mechanism to build on this
accumulated best practice. For instance, since the early days of its
work, due consideration has been given to the appointment of experts
in sexual and gender-based violence. 70 The Mechanism is further
committed to addressing the full range of sexual violence and genderbased crimes arising in the Syrian context, making sure that they
form part of our core work to support accountability for these crimes
and ensuring that the voices of women are properly heard in the
accountability process.
Let me conclude with a short reflection on the theme of the award
I am so honoured to receive today: advancing global justice.
In establishing the Mechanism, the first body of this kind ever
established, and in calling upon all States, all parties to the conflict as
well as civil society to cooperate fully with it, the General Assembly
has taken an initiative that I view as a historic step towards
accountability. The Mechanism’s creation sends a signal that
impunity for those responsible for the most heinous crimes committed
in Syria is not acceptable. It also signals that the pursuit of
accountability no longer requires a choice between national and
international (or hybrid) jurisdictions. On the contrary, the
Mechanism can be seen as a model integrating different jurisdictional
avenues at the national, regional or international level. It also
constitutes a model for bridging the gap between human rights factfinding and criminal prosecutions through proactive cooperation
between investigative and prosecutorial authorities, UN entities, and
civil society.
I am mindful of the disillusionment of people most affected by the
crimes, who have no immediate prospects of justice. The Mechanism,
which was established against a background of daunting allegations of
international crimes and flagrant impunity, is globally raising
important hopes and expectations, not least on the part of Syrian
victims and the civilian population at large.
We have to be realistic; lots of work and time is going to be
required before the Mechanism is in a position to complete and share
full-fledged files. In addition, today, we cannot anticipate whether and
when an international court or tribunal may in the future have
jurisdiction over crimes committed in Syria.
However, several criminal proceedings relating to Syria have been
initiated in various countries. In relation to these cases, the
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Mechanism can play an immediate, significant role in supporting ongoing and future investigation of crimes committed in Syria by
national prosecutors.
I believe that the Mechanism has the potential to contribute
meaningfully to ensuring accountability and providing redress for
victims, by assisting national jurisdictions and at the same time
paving the way for future prosecutions at the international level.
I am inspired by the dignity and draw strength from the courage
of the Syrian people as I carry out the important task that has been
entrusted to me as Head of the Mechanism.
I thank you for your attention and look forward to further
discussing with you.
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